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Abstract 
 
The agency theory is one of the company’s theories in a way that company is 
explained as a set of contractual explicit of implicit relationships between 
principal (shareholders) and agent (management).  The role of second party is to 
perform certain tasks and authorized to make decisions on behalf of the first 
party. Meanwhile corporate performance is very crucial for market efficiency 
since it will influenced the decision made by the market players and internal 
investors of the Companies. This study examines the relationship of agency costs 
with corporate performance. Five variables of agency costs proxies are analysed: 
Debt Ratio, Firm’s size, Growth, Expense and Efficiency. While the corporate 
performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE) . ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets 
to generate earnings while ROE measures a corporation’s profitability by 
revealing how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders 
have invested. Besides, this study examined whether there are any correlation 
between agency costs which is proxied by Debt Ratio, Firm’s size, Growth, 
Expense and Efficiency Ratio;  against Corporate Performance for the Top 50 and 
Bottom 50 Public Listed Companies in Bursa Malaysia. This study used 
secondary data which is the data from Public Listed Companies in Bursa 
Malaysia. From the total 814 population, the 100 sample was taken  from 
different categories which is the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 companies covering  
over period of 5 years from 2008 to 2012. It is found that for a certain extent, the 
Agency costs play an important roles  in relation to the Corporate 
Performance.The result gathered after analyzing the data acquired from Bursa 
Malaysia explained that only Firm’s size, Expense and Efficiency Ratio has the 
relationship with the significant value of 0.000. Debt ratio and growth variables 
was not significant with Corporate Performance. 
 
Keywords: corporate performance, market players, agency costs, corporation’s 
profitability. 
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Abstrak 
 
Teori agensi adalah salah satu teori syarikat dengan cara syarikat dijelaskan 
sebagai satu set kontrak yang jelas mengenai hubungan tersirat antara  prinsipal 
(pemegang saham) dan ejen (pengurusan). Peranan pihak kedua adalah untuk 
melaksanakan tugas-tugas tertentu dan kuasa untuk membuat keputusan bagi 
pihak yang pertama. Manakal prestasi korporat adalah sangat penting untuk 
kecekapan pasaran kerana ia akan mempengaruhi keputusan yang dibuat oleh 
peserta-peserta pasaran dan pelabur dalaman Syarikat. Kajian ini mengkaji 
hubungan antara kos agensi dengan prestasi korporat. Lima pembolehubah proksi 
bagi kos agensi dianalisis: Nisbah Hutang, saiz firma ,Pertumbuhan, Nisbah 
Perbelanjaan dan Kecekapan. Manakala prestasi korporat diukur dengan Pulangan 
atas Aset (ROA) dan Pulangan ke atas ekuiti (ROE). ROA memberi idea tentang 
bagaimana cekap pengurusan adalah dengan menggunakan aset untuk menjana 
pendapatan manakala ROE mengukur keuntungan syarikat dengan mendedahkan 
berapa banyak keuntungan syarikat dapat dijana menggunakan wang yang telah 
dilaburkan oleh pemegang-pemegang  saham. Selain itu, kajian ini meneliti sama 
ada terdapat hubungan antara kos agensi yang diproksikan oleh Nisbah Hutang, 
firma saiz, Pertumbuhan, Nisbah Perbelanjaan dan Kecekapan; terhadap Prestasi 
Korporat untuk syarikat awam pada kedudukan 50 tertinggi dan 50 yang terbawah 
yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia. Kajian ini menggunakan data sekunder yang 
merupakan data dari Syarikat Awam tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia. Dari jumlah 
814 populasi, 100 contoh telah dipilih dari kategori yang berbeza iaitu syarikat 
awam pada kedudukan 50 tertinggi dan 50 yang terbawah yang meliputi tempoh 5 
tahun iaitu dari tahun 2008 hingga 2012. Ia didapati untuk tahap tertentu, Kos 
Agensi memainkan peranan penting berhubung dengan prestasi Korporat. Hasil 
kajian setelah menganalsis data yang yang diperolehi daripada Bursa Malaysia 
menjelaskan bahawa hanya firma saiz, Nisbah Perbelanjaan dan Kecekapan 
mempunyai hubungan dengan nilai signifikan 0.000. Nisbah hutang dan 
pembolehubah pertumbuhan tidak ketara dengan Prestasi Korporat. 
 
Kata kunci: Prestasi Korporat, peserta pasaran, kos agensi, keuntungan 
perbadanan. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This study examines the relationship between Agency costs and Corporate Performance 
in Malaysia. Many empirical studies examining the relationship between ownership 
structure and company value in the Asia, Eastern Europe and USA, have on the whole 
produced inconclusive results (Claessens and Djankov, 1998; Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Morck et al., 2000; Nagar, 2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 
2001). One explanation offered is that ownership structure would not have any 
systematic impact on company value as long as managers maximise shareholders’values 
(Demsetz and Villalonga,2001). However, normally the things that often overlooked is 
the pathways through which effects of corporate ownership are diffused throughout the 
corporate environment.  
 
1.2 Background of the study 
 
The relationship of ownership structure and company value needs to be examined  in 
conjunction with key elements of a company’s operating environment, such as socio-
economic policies, governmental intervention, law and regulations that influence the 
company’s performance. This study develops an integrated model that attempts to 
explain how company performance can be affected when different ownership types 
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utilise different modes of ownership structures and ownership concentration as 
governance and controlling mechanisms to safeguard their own interests. The result can 
be shown directly through financial performance reports and the market position in 
Bursa Malaysia (Top 50 and Bottom 50). This study will look beyond nominal 
ownership concentration by showing how ownership concentration’s motivation 
reflected by the company’s financial performance might differ among major ownership 
types in Malaysian companies.  
 
The agency theory is one of the company’s theories in a way that company is explained 
as a set of contractual explicit of implicit relationships between principal (shareholders) 
and agent (management).  The role of second party is to perform certain tasks and 
authorized to make decisions on behalf of the first party. There are several key 
hypotheses in relation to this relationships (Kim and Nofsinger, 2007; Moldoveanu and 
Martin, 2001; La Porta et al. 2000; Hill and Jones, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989): 
 
1) A person characterized by awareness and diligence namely “the Management” 
that understand their interests, hence they seek to maximize their expected 
benefits which in turn, will determine their behaviours and decisions. 
2) Usually the management would like to seeks for maximization of their benefits 
even if at the account of shareholders. At this point, to reduce the opportunities 
of interest conflict at the minimum level, some mechanisms are needed. 
3) Despite having the recognition of interest conflict between both parties, there 
still have the recognition of common positive effects between them which is 
focusing on ensuring the success and continuation of the company. 
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In fact, the Agency Theory investigates the behaviours and economies of the function of 
both parties governed by 4 rules;  
 
1) Analysis of economic within the Companies;  
2) Analysis of behavioral of that manage the Companies;  
3) Analysis of accounting for agency cost as an inevitable result of conflict between 
managements and shareholders; 
4) Contract’s legal analysis, that supposed to be done between all parties to solve 
problems. 
(Chen and Fang, 2011) 
 
While Jensen and Meckling (1976) has demonstrate, within the framework of 
management  and shareholders’ behaviours, the shareholders delegate the task to the 
managements to play the role of being representative to negotiate with all concerned 
parties on their behalf  and manage the available company’s financial resources to 
reaches positive outputs exceeding the opportunity cost in which those resources could 
be utilized and maximized the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
They explained that when management is represented by the company’s only owner, 
there is no conflict of interests in such a case is achieved in its most acceptable form, 
where it will lead to the compatibility of interest between the shareholders and the 
managements. However, when the company’s capital is fragmented over a number of 
shareholders, there is a need for reliance on outside managerial expertise out of 
shareholders, hence this will raise the concern of shareholders’ interests, primarily  
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when the absence of the right for  management to get cash flows achieved from its 
outstanding performance of the company’s resources only of the agreed upon extent.  
 
In regards to cash flow which explained the differences between management control 
rights and those of shareholders, the management may deviate from its functional 
behavior from the perspective of shareholders’ wealth maximization through decision 
making to increase their own benefit and spoil the shareholders’ interest, particularly 
pertaining their residual claims represented by net cash flows remaining from net 
liquidation, or from outcomes of performance, from one side; Subsequently it will 
increase their exposure level to business risks by reason there is a gap between the 
external cash flows agreed upon with management and the projected cash flows of the 
available resources, on the other hand, which means the existence of interests conflict 
relates to agency problem which can be enshrined by managerial opportunism practices 
by exploiting the rewards and incentives system, or fostering management goodwill by 
the freedom granted to choose among alternative accounting policies within the 
intelligent disclosure of performance framework that ensures employment stability and 
achieves direct and indirect benefits. This agency problem associated with the forego 
revenues on part of shareholders and the high expenditures by managers due to 
involvement in non-profitable investments by shareholders. (Jensen, 2008; Zhao-guo et 
al. 2007). 
 
In addition, Ang et. Al (2000) said that the vigilance of the non-managing shareholders 
and other related third parties such as company’s bankers may determine the monitoring 
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of  managers’ expenditures on perquisites and other personal consumption. The 
presence of the dominant shareholders may offset both weaknesses, if any, which is the 
insufficient of external market for shares and insufficient of specific operational 
knowledge for non-managing shareholders. Furthermore, the banks could be given 
special role in delegated monitoring on behalf of other shareholders in a situation of 
heavy reliance of the non-publicly traded firms on bank financing. As such, it seems that 
there is empirical issue on determination of agency cost size for these firms. 
 
In this study we examine the underlying assumption that debt ratio changes, firm’s size 
changes, growth changes, expense ratio changes, and efficiency ratio changes are 
independent. A good measure of the company’s performance is Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Equity (ROE).  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
When compared to publicly traded firms, small business come closest to the type of 
firms depicted in the stylized theoretical model of agency costs developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). At one extreme of ownership and management structures are firms 
whose managers own 100 percent of the firm. These firms, by their definition, have no 
agency costs. At the other extreme are firms whose managers are paid employees with 
no equity in the firm. In between are firms where the managers own some, but not all, of 
their firm’s equity.  
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Armour, Hansmann, Kraakman, 2009 explained that corporate law performs 2 general 
functions as follows: 
1) It establishes corporate form structure and its supported ancillary housekeeping 
rules; 
2) It attempts to control interest conflicts among corporate constituencies, such as 
top managers and controlling shareholders namely as ‘corporate insiders’ and the 
minority shareholders or creditors namely as ‘outsiders’. 
 
These conflicts have the criterias of what economists refer to, so called the agency 
problem or principl-agent problem. For those not familiar with the economist’s jargon,  
agency problems arised whenever the action taken by one party namely agent will 
influence the welfare of another party namely principal, whereby the problem occurs in 
motivating the agent to act according to the interest of principal rather than simply in the 
interest of the agent. Generally, the agency arised in a broad contexts range that goes 
beyond those that formally be classified as agency relationship. 
 
Primarily, almost any contractual relationship is potentially subject to an agency 
problem in which the agent promises performance to the principal. The information 
about the relevant facts that the agent has is usually better than does the principal.  
Hence, the main difficulty is to assure the performance of the agent is precisely what 
was promised. Consequently, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, stint on 
his performance’s quality, or diverting to himself some of what was promised to the 
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principal. This means that as a consequence, the value of the agent’s performance to the 
principal will be dropped, either directly or because, the principal must bear monitoring 
cost  to ensure the agent performance’s quality. As a result, it can be concluded that the 
greater the tasks complexity undertaken by the agent, the wider discretion the agent 
must be given, thus higher agency costs are expected to incurred. (Ross, 1973) 
 
Armour, Hansmann, Kraakman, 2009 also emphasized on the three generic agency 
problems arise in business organizations as follows: 
 
1) It involves the company’s owners conflict with their hired managers. In this 
situation, the owners are the principals and the manager act as agents. The 
problem occurs in assuring that the managers are responsive to the interest of the 
owners rather than pursuing their own personal interests. 
 
2) It involves the conflict between the owners as the majority or controlling interest 
in the company, and the minority or non-controlling owners. In this case, the 
controlling owners act as the agents while the non controlling owners can be 
thought of as the principals, and the difficulties appears in assuring that the 
former are not expropriated by the latter. This problem happen whenever 
decisions affecting the class of owners as a whole can be controlled by some 
subset of the company’s owner; proved that it is the most conspicuous in 
tensions between the minority and majority shareholders (Luca Enriques and 
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Paolo Volpin, 2007). As such, if minority shareholders enjoy veto rights in 
regards to particular decisions, it can give rise to this second agency problems. 
Similar problems can arise between junior and senior creditors in bankruptcy 
(when creditors are the effective owners of the company), and between 
preference and ordinary shareholders. 
 
3) It involves the conflict between the company itself including specifically the 
owners and the other parties with whome the company contracts, such as the 
employees, creditors and customers. The problem lies in assuring that the 
company as agent does not behave opportunistically towards these various oher 
principals such as by misleading consumers, expropriating creditors or 
exploiting workers. 
 
In each of the foregoing problems, there are multiple principals, particularly in which 
they have different interests, or ‘heterogeneous preferences’ as economists said; will 
gives the greater challenges of assuring agent’s responsiveness. The ability to engage in 
collective action of the multiple principals will be inhibited as they are facing 
coordination costs. Hence, in turn, these will interact with the agency problems in two 
ways as per below: 
 
1) The principals will be influenced to delegate most of their decision making to an 
agents when there is coordinating difficulties between principals. (Frank and 
Daniel, 1991) 
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2) The more obviously difficult to ensure the agent does the right thing in a 
situation of more difficult for principals to coordinate on a single set of goals for 
the agent. (Kanda, 1992 and Hansmann, 1996) 
Therefore, the coordination costs between principals exacerbate agency problems. 
 
As mentioned by Armour, Hansmann, Kraakman (2009), law can play important 
function in reducing agency costs. For example, the disclosure by agents can be 
enhanced by having rules and procedures or the principal can facilitate enforcement 
actions towards the dishonest or negligent agents. 
 
In addition, in order to reduce agency costs, the foreign investors, who are typically 
minority shareholders have the incentive to push for divestment of unrelated businesses 
in business groups. In emerging economies, the business groups have traditionally 
featured unrelated diversification due to economic, cultural and political conditions in 
these countries (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Generally, reducing agency costs is in 
the interests of all parties to a transaction, agents and principals alike. 
While Sanford and Oliver (1983) in their study, to develop a method for analyzing the 
principal-agent problem which avoids the difficulties of the “first-order condition” 
approach. Their approach is focusing to solve the principal’s problem up into a costs 
and benefits computation of the different actions of the agents. For each action, they 
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consider the incentive scheme which minimizes the anticipated cost for getting the agent 
to choose that action. 
Besides, a good corporate governance system have to be developed to provide effective 
protection for shareholders and creditors, hence, they can assure themselves of getting 
their investment return. Also, it should help to foster the condusive environment to the 
efficient and sustainable growth of the corporate sector. 
 
This study therefore addresses the question whether the corporate governance viewed as 
agency costs (monitoring cost occurs)  which is proxied by the debt ratio, firm size, 
growth, expense and efficiency are important in determining the Corporate Performance 
which can be measured by the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE); 
and whether the relationship is the same for the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 of the 
Companies listed in Bursa Malaysia.  
 
1.4 Research Question  
 
1) Is there any relationship between between the corporate performance by using 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE); and the proxy of agency 
costs which is the debt ratio, firm’s size, growth, expense and efficiency? 
 
2) Is there  any differences in relationship between the proxy of agency costs for 
the Top 50 Companies and the Bottom 50 Companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, 
and the corporate performance? 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
 
1.5.1 General Objective 
 
To determine the relationship between corporate performance and the agency costs 
among public listed companies in Malaysia.   
 
1.5.2 Specific Objectives 
 
Specifically the objectives of the research are as follows: 
 
1) To examine the relationship between the corporate performance and the proxy of 
agency costs which is the debt ratio, firm’s size, growth, expense and efficiency. 
 
2) To examine the relationship between the proxy of agency costs for the Top 50 
Companies and the Bottom 50 Companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, and the 
corporate performance. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
The importance of the study comes from highlighting an important subject related to 
agency theory through demonstrating the agency costs concept in relation to some 
variables and the impact on corporate performance. The practical importance is to 
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improve some of financial policies and reduce agency cost by focusing on evidence 
presented about agency problem for guidance which having significant impact on and 
upgrade the financial performance in such a way that increase the companies’s value in 
Malaysia financial market, primarily the Malaysian business environment is facing 
insufficient of such frameworks in addition to the emergence of managerial opportunism 
phenomenon. 
 
Despite many studies conducted in regards to the agency costs in Malaysia, it is rarely 
appears of any research that differentiate the relationship between the agency costs and 
the corporate performance by categorization of the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 
Companies listed in Bursa Malaysia. This study will reveal that such differences as to 
help investor or market players in making their investment decision, particularly during 
crisis that may have different impact on certain Companies in both categories. As time 
goes by, these listing also will be changed in accordance to their financial or corporate 
performance. Hence, future research will be having different result to be observed and 
analyzed. 
 
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
This study is basically examine on the relationship between the corporate performance 
and the proxy of agency costs of only 100 selected companies listed in Bursa Malaysia 
as at 31 March 2014. Due to differences in regulatory requirements, all financial and 
 13 
unit trust companies were omitted from the study. Furthermore, the companies with 
incomplete data and the companies which fail to comply with any obligations under 
Practice Note such as Practice Note 4 (PN4) and Practice Note 17 (PN17) are also 
excluded from the study. Hence, 100 companies have been selected as sample which 
covering 5 years, from the time series of 2008 to 2012. 
 
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation 
 
According to Sekaran, 2005, the dissertation must be carefully organized, systematic, 
data-based, critical, objective, investigate the identified problem as to find the answer or 
solution. Hence, for this study, it has been organized accordingly. 
 
For Chapter One, this study will discuss about Company’s value or performance and 
how it is derived or related with company ownership or concentration through agency 
cost element such as debt ratio, firm size, growth, expense and efficiency ratio. This 
study specifically emphasizes corporate performance among the public listed companies 
of Bursa Malaysia and the five independent variables mentioned that attached to it. It 
also identifies the problem statements, research questions and research objectives, the 
significance of the study, and the scope  and limitation of study.  In Chapter Two, it 
presented the previous studies which related to the problem statement of this study, as 
well as it is needed to identify broad problem area and preliminary information 
gathering as to identify gaps between this study and previous study, which was done 
earlier on different sets of independent variable and framework. This study explained 
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the theories of agency costs and corporate/firms’ performance, as well as the empirical 
evidence on the variables selected as proxies for agency costs.  
 
In Chapter Three, it specified the methodology used in this study. Methodology is the 
process to collect information about the subjects in this study through systematic way.  
This study used secondary data which comprises of  100 selected companies listed in 
Bursa Malaysia as at 31 March 2014 for data collection. It also describes the research 
design, followed by data analysis. In Chapter Four, this study presented the analysis and 
finding on what have been discussed in Chapter Three. The  Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) has been used to run the data, proceed with analysis such as 
descriptive analysis, univariate analysis and multivariate analysis.   
 
In the final section (Chapter Five), this study provides the conclusion of the study and 
discussion on the implication, as well as some recommendations based on the result 
from Chapter Four (analysis and finding). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter present  a basic areas of research on agency costs and corporate 
performance. It will briefly discuss on the basic concepts and definitions of the various 
proxy of agency costs and previous findings concerning the agency costs and the 
corporate performance. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Coporate Performance 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) described that corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which finance suppliers to corporations assure to get the return on their investment. 
Likewise Denis and McConnell (2003) defined that corporate governance is the set of 
mechanisms for both market based and institutional that influence the company’s 
controller which is the decision maker pertaining the company’s operation and decision 
making that maximize the company’s value for its capital contributor (owners).  
 
The governance mechanism can be classified as  internal and external to the company in 
United States (US). Both, the companies’ ownership structure  and the board of 
directors are the internal mechanisms of the main interest. For external, the main 
mechanisms are the external market for corporate control such as the legal system and 
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the takeover market (Cremers and Nair, 2004). As the company’s performance can be 
influenced by the corporate governance mechanisms, thus, effect agency cost of the 
company through the various proxies have been included. Among the corporate 
governance tested are the debt ratio, size of company, growth, expense and efficiency 
factors. 
 
The board involvement in corporate affairs are significant to the influence of the board 
size and composition. The board size and composition may influence the impact of 
insiders and block ownership on company’s performance, hence, it should be controlled. 
Both could act as either substitute or complement for the structure of ownership. Singh 
and Davidson III (2003) stated that both board size and composition may reflect its 
ability to be an efficient guide and they found that company performance is increased by 
smaller boards, consistently with Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Jensen (1993), as well 
as Lipton and Lorsh (1992),  It is also supported by Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Yermack 
(1996) which stated that smaller board will lead to increase in company performance. 
 
In several other countries, the previous studies has also found that there is negative 
relationship between board size and company performance. Mak and Yuanto (2002) 
examine the relationship between both factors in Malaysia and Singapore and they 
found that the board size is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Similarly in Finland, there 
is evidence that shows the negative relationship between size of board and profitability, 
found by Eisenberg et al (1998), for a small and medium size companies. Besides, that 
size of board is inversely related to operating performance in UK companies (Carline et 
al., 2002). 
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As confirmed by numerous other studies, it has been futher supported that small boards 
is more effective as compared to large boards (Lipton and Lorssch, 1992), ( Gladstein, 
1984), (Olson, 1982), (Shaw, 1981), (Jewel and Reitz, 1981); and (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This is also consistent with Mishra et al’s (2001) research on 
corporate governance of family companies in Norway which they found that size of 
board has negatively significant coefficient indicating that the higher q values is 
achieved by the smaller board size companies. 
 
In contrast for Pearce and Zahra (1991) and Pfeffer (1973), who suggested that by 
securing a broader resource platform and network bulding with external environment in 
a way to increase in board size and diversity may yield the benefits, thus fostering 
identity of the corporate. Also, based on Adam and Mehran (2003) findings discovered 
that there is a positive and significant relationship the board size and company 
performance using Tobin’s Q measurement. While in the case of mergers and 
acquisitions, there is no empirical evidence on the impact of the size of board on bid 
premiums (Brewer III et al., 2000).  
 
Based on Fama and Jensen (1983), they explained that by monitoring services and 
lending experience , the outsiders of board could strengthen the value of the company. 
Outside directors are supposed to be protector of the shareholders’ interests through 
monitoring activities. This is further supported by Hermalin and Weishbach (1991) and 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) that the argument pertaining the outside director are more 
critical disciplining device and effective monitors for managers. Furthermore, the 
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effectiveness of board and company’s performance could improve by having outside 
directors, as agreed by previous empirical findings. (Cotter et al., 1997), (Brickley et al., 
1994), (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), (Weisbach, 1998), and (Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985). 
 
This evidence further supported by McKnight and Mira (2003) in which they found that 
based on Tobin’s Q measurement, there is a positive and signicant relationship between 
the proportion of outsiders and company performance. Other empirical evidence in 
relation to composition of board towards company performance such as Lee et 
al.(1992), and Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that through the evaluation of strategic 
decisions by the outside directors may increase the companies’ value. Probably, in 
boosting the company’s value by outside directors, the role in the dismissal of 
inefficient and poorly performing management is also emphasized.  (Weisbach, 1998). 
 
However, there is in fact negative correlation between board independence and 
performance, found by the study of Klein et al (2004), Subrahmanyam et al (1997), and 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). This evidence is further supported by Weir and Laing 
(1999), and Yermack (1996) in which they found that the proportion of outside directors 
is negatively correlated with company’s performance. While based on study by Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006), Klein (1998) and Mehran (1995) discovered that the outsider 
proportion on the board of directors is not significant related with the performance 
based on Tobin’s Q and ROA measurement. 
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2.2 The Theory of Agency Costs 
 
Many difficulties associated with the insufficiency of the current theory of the firm 
which also can be viewed as specific cases of the agency relationships theory that 
leading to the growing of literature (Ross, 1973; Heckerman, 1975). Independently, this 
literature has been developed despite concerning on the similar problem as the 
approaches are highly complementary to each other. 
 
The study of Jensen & Meckling (1976) stated a contract under which one or more 
persons, both the principals and the agents engage one another to perform some tasks or 
service on their behalf which involved delegation of some decision making authority to 
the agent, namely agency relationship. There is relevant reason to believe that the agent 
sometimes will not act in the best interests of the principal if both parties are utility 
maximizers in this relationship. To limit the divergences from the principal’s interest, 
appropriate incentives for the agent has been established; as well as by incurring 
monitoring costs designated as to limit the agent’s aberrant activities. Besides, in certain 
situation, there is a payment to the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) in order to 
guarantee that he will not act in a way that could harm the principal; or to ensure that the 
principal will be compensated if he do so. Nevertheless, generally, it is unlikely for the 
principal or agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from 
the viewpoint of the principal. 
 
In most of agency relationship, the principal and agent will have positive monitoring 
and bonding costs either financial or non financial; and there will be some divergence 
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between the decisions of the agent in which would maximize the principal’s welfare. 
The dollar equivalent of the welfare reduction experienced by the principal by reason of 
this divergence is also considered as cost of the agency relationship; and  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) refer to this latter cost as the “residual loss”. 
 
They classify these agency costs into monitoring expenses by shareholders, bonding 
expenses by the agent and residual loss. This opinion supported  by the studies of Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990); and Hill and Jones (1992) consider the agency costs by giving 
an example of the cost incurred for monitoring by the principal as well as manager’s 
bonding expenses and the residual loss. They show that the differences in actions and 
interests from both principals and managers may lead to the costs appear and affect 
eventually towards the benefit of the principal, and in such a way on company value. 
There are other point of view from Harris and Glegg (2009) who believe that the 
restriction of shareholders right may resulting to the existence and increase of agency 
costs. 
 
2.3 The empirical evidence of Agency Costs 
 
Alford and Stangeland (2005) conducted a study that intend to explain impact of 
taxation imposed on income of the managers being a kind of political cost, on the 
relationship between agency costs and performance. They suggested that the importance 
of  agency cost and company’s efficiency  is personal tax, as well as it has negative 
impact on the performance of manageria. Based on their findings, the comparison for 
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the results of hypothesis testing reached 2 different samples, which is belongs to 1995 
covering 1761 companies and 2002 covering 1785 companies in the same country and 
sector respectively. It reveals that there is always negative impact of personal tax on the 
relationship of agency cost and performance. 
 
Whilst Wang (2010) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between agency 
cost and cash flow, as well as to investigate on how such relationship could affect the 
company performance. Based on the findings, this study conducted on Taiwan publicly-
listed companies were focusing on 3 main points which is there is significant effect 
between free cash flows on agenct cost; the agency cost positively effect on company 
performance; and no significant effect pertaining the effect of agency cost on company 
performance. 
 
The following will stated the review of the literature on the relationship between various 
corporate performance characteristics which includes return on equity and return on 
asset; and the proxies of agency cost, specifically debt ratio, firm size, growth, expense, 
and efficiency. 
 
2.3.1 Debt ratio 
 
Brander and Lewis (1986) conclusions indicated that the financial decisions of the 
companies are interlinked with their strategic options in relation to obtaining a particular 
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market share level. They conclude that the debt can be either positive or negative 
significantly related to the market power. 
 
The use of debts can reduce the need for outside financing through the issuance of 
shares, thus, it will help diminish the manager-stockholder agency problem. In addition, 
the use of debts can reduce the agency problem of over-investment by committing the 
company to fixed interest payments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Rehmann (2007) conclude that there is negative relationship between debt used by the 
firm and its profitability. Omar et al. (2007) conclude that the debt ratio of the Big-4 
affiliated audit firms has significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, while no 
significant relationship is recorded with ROA. The debt ratio has a significantly positive 
effect on board ownership with both Tobin’s Q and ROA. The study by Crutchley and 
Jensen (1999) proved the hypothesis that financial leverage or debt ratio is negatively 
related to agency cost. Meanwhile, Doukas et al. (2001) proposed that the measurement 
of agency costs should be inversely related to the fraction of debt in the company’s 
capital structure. 
 
Hence, this study  proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha1: Debt ratio is significantly related with the corporate performance 
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2.3.2 Firm’s size 
 
Doukas et al. (2001) has stated that agency conflicts are more prominent in larger 
companies where the number of managers and shareholders is greater. That means the 
firm size is positively related to the agency cost.   
 
Ramasamy et al. (2005) in their paper said that profitability (represented by Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA)) exhibit a positive relationship with firm 
size (the log of firm assets as proxy). Their conclusion indicated that large firms have all 
the options of small firms. Besides, the large firms enjoyed higher profit rates by having 
the access to capital markets and the capability of harnessing economies of scales from 
which small firms are excluded. 
 
Moyer et al. (1989) used the market value of outstanding shares (or market 
capitalization) as a proxy for company size. They reasoned that the greater the market 
value of outstanding equity, the greater the aggregate potential gains to investors. 
Theoretically, companies with higher potential agency costs are expected to be 
monitored more closely.  
 
Hence, this study  proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha2: Firm size is significantly related with the corporate performance 
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2.3.3 Company growth 
 
Based on Moyer et al. (1989), high growth companies require more monitoring than 
established and mature companies in view of their asset-base of the company changes 
quickly.  In line with the rapid changes, it allow the manager to engage in risk shifting 
behavior due to availability of larger amounts of assets, hence, it involves agency costs. 
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between compay growth and agency costs. 
The research results showed that company growth, proxied by the growth rate of assets, 
was positively and significantly related to agency costs in companies.  
 
Hence, this study  proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha3: Company growth is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
2.3.4 Expense 
 
Expense ratio is defined as the ratio of operating expenses to annual sales. With 
reference to Ang et al. (2000), expense ratio is considered a direct measurement of 
agency costs because it measures how effectively the operating costs, including 
excessive perquisite consumption, and other direct agency costs controlled by 
management of the companies. Among the items considered as operating expenses are 
salaries, utilities, supplies, advertising, transportation, depreciation and insurance. Most 
of these items can be overstated in terms of the amount for the benfit of managers in 
view of these items are subject to discretion of the management. As such, high operating 
expenses raise the probability of misuse of funds by the management of the companies. 
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Therefore, the higher the expense ratio, the higher would be the agency costs in a 
company. 
 
Hence, this study  proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha4: The expense is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
2.3.5 Efficiency 
 
Besides using the expense ratio, the studies by Florackis & Ozkan, (2004), Singh and 
Davidson III (2003), and Ang et al. (2000) used  the asset utilization ratio (efficiency 
ratio) as proxy for agency costs. This efficiency ratio was defined as the ratio of annual 
sales to total assets in which it measure the effectiveness of the company’s management 
deploys its assets.  
 
Based on Brealey and Myers (2000), a higher efficiency ratio signals a more efficient 
management team in utilizing the company’s assets to generate more sales. Particularly, 
this variable is a proxy for the loss in revenue attributable to non-efficient utilization of 
assets resulting from poor investment and management decisions (such as investing in 
non-productive assets and mismatch in asset funding), or from negative management 
behavior (such as exerting less effort to help in revenue generation). Overall, it can be 
concluded that lower asset utilization ratio indicates a high agency costs. In contrast, 
higher asset utilization will indicates lower agency costs. 
 
Hence, this study  proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha5: The efficiency is significantly related with the corporate performance 
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This study will integrate the results from previous studies and agency costs theory to 
develop and to test a model that links to the relationship between the proxies of agency 
costs to the corporate performance. Specifically, the study will examine: (1) the 
relationship between debt ratio, firm’s size, growth, expense and efficiency towards 
public listed companies’performance; (2) the differences in relationship between the 
proxy of agency costs for the Top 50 Companies and the Bottom 50 Companies listed in 
Bursa Malaysia, and the corporate performance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter discuss the research methodology which has been carried out in order to 
test the hypothesis of this study. This study employed quantitative research method 
whereby data were collected and analyzed using SPSS. This chapter primarily 
investigated the relationship between debt ratio, firm’s size, growth, expense and 
efficiency and public listed companies’performance. The objective is to identify the 
relationship, the effect of the variables and the empirical research that has to be based on 
the research question. 
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3.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Based on the research hyphotesis, theoretical framework has been constructed as 
follows:   
 
DR 
 
   SZ 
 
GWTH 
 
EXP 
 
EFF 
 
Independent Variables     Dependent Variables 
 
Figure 1 : Research model 
 
Note: DR= Debt Ratio, SZ= Firm Size, GWTH= Growth, EXP= Expense ratio, EFF= 
Efficiency ratio, and ROA = Return on Asset, ROE = Return on Equity.  
ROA / ROE 
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3.2 Hypotheses of Study 
 
Based on the discussion on the literature review of studies in regards to the determining 
the relationship between agency costs and the determinants of corporate performance, 
the following hypotheses are developed for this study: 
 
Ha1: Debt ratio is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
Ha2: Firm size is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
Ha3: Company growth is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
Ha4: The expense is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
Ha5: The efficiency is significantly related with the corporate performance 
 
 
From the above hypothesis, this study used Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE) representing the profitability measurement of the corporate performance. 
Also, since there is no direct measurement of agency costs, we are using the proxies 
based on previous studies.  
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3.3 Research Design 
 
The study adopted a quantitative research design by using secondary data. The data 
collected from Bursa  Malaysia which covered the time series of 2008 to 2012. This is a 
correlation research because the objective of this study is to determine the relationship 
between between debt ratio, firm’s size, growth, expense and efficiency and corporate 
performance. 
 
3.4 Data Collection : Population and Sampling 
 
The population of this study are 814 Public Listed Companies in Bursa Malaysia as at 
31 December 2012. There are 10 industries listed  in Bursa Malaysia, namely Basic 
Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, 
Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. The systematic sampling 
was applied in the selection of the companies, which is the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 of 
the Bursa Malaysia’s ranking. According to Sowell and Casey (1982) ten percent of a 
population is a number that can be managed in a study. Therefore, from 814 companies, 
listed in Bursa Malaysia, a total of 100 companies was selected (twelve percent – more 
are better). This is also based on Lim (1981) which have found that the ownership of 
shareholding and wealth among the 100 largest ﬁrms in the 1960s to be highly 
concentrated. 
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However, due to the differences in regulatory requirements and/or financial statement 
presentation, the omission is applied on all financial and unit trust companies, or in 
other words, the companies listed under finance sector/industry from this study. 
Furthermore, the study excluded the companies with incomplete data for the period of 
study (2008 – 2012); those companies that has been disposed off or taken over during 
the period of study;  and those companies which fail to comply with any obligations 
under Practice Note such as Practice Note 4 (PN4) and Practice Note 17 (PN17).  
 
As a result, on top of exclusion of the above-mentioned companies, the researcher 
selected the top 50 and the bottom 50 companies listed on the main board of Bursa 
Malaysia; across 5 years from 2008 to 2012 as sample. 
 
3.5 Operational Definitions 
 
3.5.1 Debt Ratio 
The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, expressed in percentage, 
and can be interpreted as the proportion of a company's assets that are financed by debt. 
The higher this ratio, the more leveraged the company and the greater its financial risk. 
 
3.5.2 Firm’s size 
To the present date firm size remains a poorly defined concept. Where the use of size 
is required by theory, empirical studies typically revert to some proxy or other, such 
as the number of employees, Total Assets, Sales or Market Capitalisation. Conversely,  
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the concept of firm size has also been used to proxy for numerous theoretical constructs 
ranging from risk to liquidity or even political costs (Ball and Foster, 1982). 
 
In the accounting side, McLeay (1986)  and McLeay and Fieldsend (1987) have 
examined the distribution of ratios formed with accounting variables that are 
summations of positive transactions (such  as Sales Stocks, Creditors or Current Assets) 
asserting that they should exhibit a proportionate behavior. Empirical work by 
Trigueiros (1995) has extended this result, showing that lognormality is a widespread 
feature of accounting data.  Not only summations of positive transactions, many other 
positive valued items have cross-section distributions that are lognormal. 
 
In this study, the researcher used the natural log (ln) of the market value of outstanding 
shares of a company’s common stock at particular year-end.   
 
3.5.3 Company Growth 
 
Significant levels of cash flow and earnings compared to other companies are used to 
determine if a company falls into Growth companies or vice versa.  Growth companies 
typically have something whether it is an innovative product or a service that draws in 
more consumers. The stock price of publicly-traded growth companies typically 
increases at a rapid pace. In this study, the researcher used  compound annual growth 
rate in company total assets over a five-year period  
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3.5.4 Expense ratio 
 
An expense ratio is determined through an annual calculation, where a fund's operating 
expenses are divided by the average dollar value of its assets under management. 
Operating expenses are taken out of a fund's assets and lower the return to a fund's 
investors. 
 
Depending on the type of fund, operating expenses vary widely. The largest component 
of operating expenses is the fee paid to a fund's investment manager/advisor. Other 
costs include recordkeeping, custodial services, taxes, legal expenses, marketing fee,  
accounting and auditing fees. A fund's trading activity, the buying and selling of 
portfolio securities, is not included in the calculation of the expense ratio. 
 
3.5.5 Efficiency ratio 
 
Ratios that are typically used to analyze how well a company uses its assets and 
liabilities internally. Efficiency Ratios can calculate the turnover of receivables, the 
repayment of liabilities, the quantity and usage of equity and the general use of 
inventory and machinery. 
 
Some common ratios are accounts receivable turnover, fixed asset turnover, sales to 
inventory, sales to net working capital, accounts payable to sales and stock turnover 
ratio. These ratios are meaningful when compared to peers in the same industry and can 
identify business that are better managed relative to the others. Also, efficiency ratios 
 34 
are important because an improvement in the ratios usually translate to improved 
profitability. 
 
3.5.6 Corporate Performance 
 
Management systems today do a good job of budgeting, financial and  management 
reporting, and rudimentary business intelligence analysis that will connected real-world  
decisions and corporate actions. Corporate performance comprise of qualitative and 
quantitative achievements. In this study, the corporate performance represented by the 
Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).  
 
3.6 Measurement of Variables/ Instruments 
 
In this study, the data has been gathered and analyzed using  various different statistical 
tools as follows:  
 
We used the descriptive statistic to get the value of means and to test the differences of 
means of the variables under both categories, the top 50 and the bottom 50 of listed 
companies. On top of that, we used univariate analysis and the Pearson Correllation 
Matrix, as well as the regression model analysis to determine the coefficient correlation 
between dependent and independent variables (Favero et al. (2006); Gorriz and Fumas 
(2005); and Anderson and Reeb (2003)). The statistical analysis is to testify whether 
there is any significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
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As such, we develop two specific models or equations to analyze the relationship 
between the agency costs and corporate performance. 
 
A multiple regression model used to explain the profitability of the companies which is 
proxied by the Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The hypothesized 
relationship between ROA/ROE and its determinants is as follows: 
 
ROA  = α + β1 DEBT RATIO +β2 SIZE + β3 GROWTH + β4 EXPENSE + 
   β5 EFFICIENCY + е 
 
 
ROE = α + β1 DEBT RATIO +β2 SIZE + β3 GROWTH + β4 EXPENSE + 
   β5 EFFICIENCY + е 
 
Where,  
 
ROA : 
Return on Assets (ROA) is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its 
total assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings. Calculated as: Net Income divided by Average Total Assets of the 
company. 
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ROE :  
Return on Equity (ROE) measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much 
profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. Calculated as: 
Net Income Available for Common Shareholders divided by the Average Total 
Common Equity of the company 
 
DEBT RATIO : 
Total Debt to Total Asset. Calculated as : Short term borrowings plus the long term 
borrowings and subsequently divided by total assets of the company. 
 
SIZE :  
The natural log (ln) of the market value of outstanding shares of a company’s common 
stock at year-end 2012.  The outstanding shares is calculated as the net of treasury 
shares where it is the combined number of primary common share equivalents of all 
classes outstanding in millions as of Balance Sheet date for multiple share companies. 
Excluded unearned shares in Employee Stock-Option Plan (ESOP) i.e shares that have 
not vested. Once they vest they are no longer held by the company and are included in 
Shares Outstanding. If no disclosure, assumption is that shares are vested. 
 
GROWTH : 
Compound annual growth rate in company total assets over a five-year period ending in 
2012. 
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EXPENSE : 
Five-year average, ending in 2012 of company operating expense divided by annual 
sales. The operating expenses (OPEX) includes selling & Administrative expenses 
(SG&A) and other operating expenses after cost of goods sold (COGS). If there is no 
breakdown between COGS and SG&A, it includes the entire amount which represents 
total OPEX. Expenses which are attributed to non operating business or one-time gains 
or losses are excluded in Operating Expenses. 
 
EFFICIENCY : 
Five-year average, ending in 2012 of company annual sales divided by total assets. 
Total operating revenues lessvarious adjustments to Gross Sales. Adjustments: Returns, 
discounts, allowances, excise taxes, insurance charges, sales taxes, and value added 
taxes (VAT). Includes revenues from financial subsidiaries in industrial companies if 
the consolidation includes those subsidiaries throughout the report. Excludes inter-
company revenue and revenues from discontinued operations. Includes subsidies from 
federal or local government in certain industries (i.e transportation or utilities). 
 
3.6.1 Demographic Profile 
 
As mentioned earlier, the population of this study are 814 Public Listed Companies in 
Bursa Malaysia as at 31 March 2014. It consists of 10 industries listed  in Bursa 
Malaysia. Meanwhile the sample taken was the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 companies  
based on the Bursa Malaysia’s ranking. All of these population and sample was 
categorized under 4 classes namely Industry, Sector, Sub Sector and Super sector. 
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3.6.1.1 Industry 
There are 10 type of industries in Bursa Malaysia. The details as follows: 
 
 
ICB_INDUSTRY_NAME 
 
All 
 
Top 50 
 
Bottom 50 
 
Basic Materials 71 2 4 
Consumer Goods 168 12 11 
Consumer Services 59 11 1 
Financials 106 5 `- 
Health Care 19 3 - 
Industrials 265 7 22 
Oil & Gas 24 3 1 
Technology 81 - 9 
Telecommunications 11 3 2 
Utilities 10 4 - 
Grand Total 
 
814 
 
50 
 
50 
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3.6.1.2 Sector 
There are 37 type of Sector in Bursa Malaysia. The details as follows: 
 
ICB_SECTOR_NAME 
 
All 
 
Top 50 
 
Bottom 50 
 
Automobiles & Parts 21 2 1 
Banks 11 - - 
Beverages 9 3 - 
Chemicals 27 2 3 
Construction & Materials 97 3 9 
Electricity 2 1 - 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 34 - 1 
Financial Services 13 - - 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 4 1 1 
Food & Drug Retailers 1 - - 
Food Producers 61 6 2 
Forestry & Paper 13 - 1 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 8 3 - 
General Industrials 31 1 1 
General Retailers 21 4 1 
Health Care Equipment & Services 14 3 - 
Household Goods & Home Construction 35 - 5 
Industrial Engineering 51 1 6 
Industrial Metals & Mining 29 - - 
Industrial Transportation 23 2 1 
Leisure Goods 7 - - 
Life Insurance 1 - - 
Media 8 - - 
Mining 2 - - 
Mobile Telecommunications 7 2 1 
Nonlife Insurance 6 - - 
Oil & Gas Producers 4 2 - 
Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 20 1 1 
Personal Goods 34 - 3 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 5 - - 
Real Estate Investment & Services 69 5 - 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 6 - - 
Software & Computer Services 61 - 5 
Support Services 29 - 4 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 20 - 4 
Tobacco 1 1 - 
Travel & Leisure 29 7 - 
 Grand Total  814 50 50 
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3.6.1.3 Sub Sector 
There are 87 type of Sector in Bursa Malaysia. The details as follows: 
ICB_SUBSECTOR_NAME All Top 50 Bottom 50 
Airlines 2 1 - 
Alternative Electricity 1 1 - 
Aluminum 4 - - 
Apparel Retailers 3 - - 
Auto Parts 15 - 1 
Automobiles 4 2 - 
Banks 11 - - 
Biotechnology 1 - - 
Brewers 2 2 - 
Broadcasting & Entertainment 1 - - 
Broadline Retailers 7 2 - 
Building Materials & Fixtures 52 1 8 
Business Support Services 12 - - 
Business Training Employment Agency 1 - - 
Clothing & Accessories 20 - 3 
Coal 1 - - 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks 9 1 1 
Commodity Chemicals 7 - 1 
Computer Hardware 4 - 2 
Computer Services 32 - 3 
Consumer Electronics 7 - - 
Consumer Finance 2 - - 
Containers & Packaging 26 - 1 
Conventional Electricity 1 - - 
Delivery Services 3 - - 
Distillers & Vintners 1 - - 
Diversified Industrials 5 1 - 
Diversified REITs 1 - - 
Durable Household Products 9 - - 
Electrical Components & Equipment 24 - 1 
Electronic Equipment 10 - - 
Exploration & Production 3 1 - 
Farming, Fishing & Plantations 37 4 1 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 4 1 1 
Food Products 24 2 1 
Food Retailers & Wholesalers 1 - - 
Footwear 5 - - 
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ICB_SUBSECTOR_NAME All Top 50 Bottom 50 
Forestry 13 - 1 
Full Line Insurance 2 - - 
Furnishings 22 - 5 
Gambling 6 3 - 
General Mining 1 - - 
Health Care Providers 5 1 - 
Heavy Construction 45 2 1 
Home Improvement Retailers 2 - 1 
Hotels 9 2 - 
Industrial & Office REITs 4 - - 
Industrial Machinery 42 - 5 
Industrial Suppliers 9 - 2 
Integrated Oil & Gas 1 1 - 
Internet 3 - 1 
Investment Services 8 - - 
Iron & Steel 24 - - 
Life Insurance 1 - - 
Marine Transportation 8 1 - 
Media Agencies 3 - - 
Medical Equipment 1 - - 
Medical Supplies 8 2 - 
Mobile Telecommunications 7 2 1 
Mortgage Finance 1 - - 
Multiutilities 3 3 - 
Nondurable Household Products 4 - - 
Nonferrous Metals 1 - - 
Oil Equipment & Services 20 1 1 
Personal Products 9 - - 
Pharmaceuticals 4 - - 
Property & Casualty Insurance 3 - - 
Publishing 4 - - 
Real Estate Holding & Development 69 5 - 
Reinsurance 1 - - 
Restaurants & Bars 6 1 - 
Retail REITs 1 - - 
Semiconductors 7 - 2 
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ICB_SUBSECTOR_NAME All Top 50 Bottom 50 
Soft Drinks 6 1 - 
Software 26 - 1 
Specialized Consumer Services 2 - - 
Specialty Chemicals 20 2 2 
Specialty Finance 2 - - 
Specialty Retailers 7 2 - 
Telecommunications Equipment 9 - - 
Tires 2 - - 
Tobacco 1 1 - 
Transportation Services 9 1 - 
Travel & Tourism 6 - - 
Trucking 3 - 1 
Waste & Disposal Services 7 - 2 
Water 5 - - 
 Grand Total  814 50 50 
 
3.6.1.4 Super Sector 
There are 19 type of Sector in Bursa Malaysia. The details as follows: 
ICB_SUPERSECTOR_NAME All Top 50 Bottom 50 
Automobiles & Parts 21 2 1 
Banks 11 - - 
Basic Resources 44 - 1 
Chemicals 27 2 3 
Construction & Materials 97 3 9 
Financial Services 13 - - 
Food & Beverage 70 9 2 
Health Care 19 3 - 
Industrial Goods & Services 168 4 13 
Insurance 7 - - 
Media 8 - - 
Oil & Gas 24 3 1 
Personal & Household Goods 77 1 8 
Real Estate 75 5 - 
Retail 22 4 1 
Technology 81 - 9 
Telecommunications 11 3 2 
Travel & Leisure 29 7 - 
Utilities 10 4 - 
 Grand Total  814 50 50 
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3.6.2 Variables 
 
Variables is a measurable characteristic that varies. It may change from group to group, 
person to person, or even within one person over time. The purpose of all research is to 
describe and explain variance in the world. Variance is simply the difference; that is, 
variation that occurs naturally in the world or change that we create as a result of a 
manipulation. A variable is either a result of some force or is itself the force that causes 
a change in another variable. In experiments, these are called dependent and 
independent variables respectively. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in this study, the dependent variable is Corporate Performance 
which is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). 
Meanwhile the independent varaibles involved are Deb Ratio, Firm’s Size, Company 
Growth, Expense Ratio and Efficiency Ratio. 
 
3.6.2.1 Debt Ratio 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the use of debts can reduce the need for 
outside financing through the issuance of shares, thus, it will help diminish the manager-
stockholder agency problem. In addition, the use of debts can reduce the agency 
problem of over-investment by committing the company to fixed interest payments. 
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3.6.2.2 Firm’s Size 
 
Doukas et al. (2001) has stated that agency conflicts are more prominent in larger 
companies where the number of managers and shareholders is greater. That means the 
firm size is positively related to the agency cost.   
 
3.6.2.3 Company Growth 
 
Based on Moyer et al. (1989), high growth companies require more monitoring than 
established and mature companies in view of their asset-base of the company changes 
quickly.  In line with the rapid changes, it allow the manager to engage in risk shifting 
behavior due to availability of larger amounts of assets, hence, it involves agency costs. 
 
 
3.6.2.4 Expense Ratio 
 
With reference to Ang et al. (2000), expense ratio is considered a direct measurement of 
agency costs because it measures how effectively the operating costs, including 
excessive perquisite consumption, and other direct agency costs controlled by 
management of the companies. 
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3.6.2.5 Efficiency 
 
Based on Brealey and Myers (2000), a higher efficiency ratio signals a more efficient 
management team in utilizing the company’s assets to generate more sales. 
 
3.7 Data Collection Procedure 
 
This study used secondary data regarding the financial indicators for the period of 2008 
to 2012. The data was taken from the annual reports of companies which can be 
extracted from the financial database of Bursa Malaysia, namely Datastream.  
 
Several control variables used to represent companies characteristics such as firm size, 
which is the natural log of total asset (ln asset) of the company and companies debt ratio 
as a firm leverage (Lev) by calculating total debt over total asset of the company. Other 
than that are company growth, expense and efficiency ratio. 
 
This study also represent the profitability as a performance measurement by using 
accounting measures such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) . 
 
Higher ROA shows the company uses its asset effectively in serving shareholders’ 
economic interests. Meanwhile, ROE indicates the expectation of something in return 
from investor investment. In addition, it also measures the effectiveness of shareholder 
investment.. These performance measurement have been widely used as proxies for 
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company performance (Sraer and Thesmar, 2006; Favero et al., 2006; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Rhoades et al., 2001; Daily and Dalton, 1998; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990).  
 
Both has been chosen as there is no consensus regarding the dependent variable options 
in measuring performance. We hope that the measurement selected can give beneficial 
information and benefits. However, no doubt on the use of alternative measurements 
that will help to check the robustness of the findings. 
 
3.8 Technique of Data Analysis 
 
The statistical testing is a step of statistical inference by using the data of study. The 
statistic result is called statistically significant if it has been anticipated as unlikely to 
have occurred by chance alone, based on pre-determined threshold probability, the 
significance level. These tests has been used in determining the outcomes of our study 
that can lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis for a pre-specified significance level 
which can help in making decision whether the results have enough information to cast 
doubt on conventional wisdom, given that it has been used to establish the null 
hypothesis.  
 
In general, many studies used Pearson chi-square statistical test to determine whether  
their results are significants which means whether there is a relationship between two 
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categorical variables, and whether to accept or reject the proposed null hypothesis and 
alternate hyphotesis. The null hypothesis states that there is no considerable 
dissimilarity between the expected and observed result. Chi-square is the sum of the 
squared difference between observed and the expected data, divided by the expected 
data in all possible categories. 
 
Moayad and Tawfeeq (2013) in their study used the nonparametric statistical tests and 
Kendall correlation to measure the association between dependent and independent 
variables; and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine the differences between both 
variables. Whilst Hazlindar, Fazilah and Afizar (2008) in their study used panel pooled 
regression model analysis in order to determine the coefficient correlation between 
dependent and independent variables; which is in line with study of Favero et al (2006), 
Gorriz and Fumas (2005); and Anderson and Reeb (2003).  
 
For this study, we used the univariate analysis and multiple regression model to explain 
the relationship between the profitability of the companies which is proxied by the 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) with the debt ratio, firm’s size, 
growth, expense and efficiency as proxy of agency costs. 
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3.8.1 Descriptive Statistic : Frequency Distributions 
 
Descriptive statistics is the discipline of quantitatively describing the main features of a 
collection of information, or the quantitative description itself. Descriptive statistics are 
distinguished from inferential statistics (or inductive statistics), in that descriptive 
statistics aim to summarize a sample, rather than use the data to learn about the 
population that the sample of data is thought to represent. This generally means that 
descriptive statistics, unlike inferential statistics, are not developed on the basis of 
probability theory. Even when a data analysis draws its main conclusions using 
inferential statistics, descriptive statistics are generally also presented. This study has 
presented the frequency distribution of the sample in the following chapter. 
 
3.8.2 Hypotheses Testing : Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is a useful statistical formula that measures the 
strength between variables and relationships. In the field of statistics, this formula is 
often referred to as the Pearson R test. When conducting a statistical test between two 
variables, the reseacher has decided to conduct a Pearson Correlation Coefficient value 
to determine how strong that relationship is between those two variables. 
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3.9 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, research framework is identified to be the base for this study. 
Hypotheses of this study have been constructed in order to align with the research 
objective. Researcher also have identified the related research design, measurement of 
variable or instruments been used. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
All of the information needed are gathered and it has been analyzed by SPSS software. 
In this chapter, we use the descriptive statistic, Pearson correlation, Univariate analysis 
of variance and Multiple linear regression. This chapter presents the results on the 
determinants of relationship between corporate performance with debt ratio, firm size, 
growth, expense, efficiency, profit margin, and board rank. In this study the 
performance of the company is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). ROA gives an idea on how efficient management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings. ROE measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how 
much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis : 100 Public Listed Companies 
 
Table 4.1 gives the descriptive analysis for the main variables used in this study. The 
table shows the average debt ratio proportion is 21.91 per cent. That means on average, 
the amount of debts of the sample companies is nearly to one-quarter of its total assets. 
While for growth, the average is 3.7 per cent with some companies having a 89.73 per 
cent and -54.90 per cent growth. The mean expense ratio for the five-year average, 
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ending 2012 recorded 70.74 per cent and the five-year average, ending 2012 efficiency 
ratio was 78.50 per cent.  
 
For profit margin, the average is -37.52 per cent with some companies enjoying 210.44 
per cent profit margin while some of the other companies bearing negative margin. The 
mean for board rank is 50 per cent while for ROA and ROE, it has recorded average of 
2.67 per cent and 5.27 per cent respectively. 
 
Finally, the mean size, which was proxied by the natural log (ln) of market 
capitalization, was 5.75. This shows that at the end of 2012, the average market 
capitalization of the companies in the sample was RM315,350,000. The average total 
sales for 2012 of the sample companies stood at RM3,723,413,771, showing that the 
average total sales for the companies was 11.80 times greater than the average market 
capitalization. 
 
With reference to the finding from the study by Bala and Darrly (2005), it showed that 
there is positive relationship between profitability [based on Return on Equity (ROE) 
and Return on Assets (ROA)] and the firm size (which is proxied by the log of firm 
assets). They concluded that large firms have all the options of small firms, as well as 
harnessing economies of scales capability and capital markets access from which small 
firms are excluded, hence leading to higher profit rates. 
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Table 4.1 : Descriptive Statistics : 100 Public Listed Companies 
  Debt 
ratio 
Size Growth Expense Efficiency ROA ROE 
  
Mean 0.2192 5.7536 0.0374 0.7074 0.7850 0.0267 0.0527 
Median 0.1962 5.4116 0.0380 0.2643 0.5958 0.0308 0.0711 
Standard 
deviation 
0.1727 3.4726 0.1535 2.0506 0.6196 0.1098 0.3059 
Variance 0.0300 12.0590 0.0240 4.2050 0.3840 0.0120 0.0940 
Skewness 0.8870 0.0580 1.2770 8.6670 1.5140 0.9080 1.2170 
Kurtosis 0.7630 -1.8560 10.9190 81.2660 2.2530 3.5800 13.1250 
Minimum 0.0000 0.6677 -0.5490 0.0266 0.0781 
-
0.2223 -1.3034 
Maximum 0.7865 10.9545 0.8973 20.0073 2.9263 0.5074 1.7595 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis : Top 50 Public Listed Companies 
 
Table 4.2  gives the descriptive analysis for the main variables for the Top 50 companies 
used in this study. The table shows the average debt ratio proportion is 22.70 per cent. 
That means on average, the amount of debts for the population of 50 companies is 
nearly to one-quarter of its total assets. While for growth, the average is 10.79 per cent 
with some companies having a 37.38 per cent and -12.88 per cent growth. The mean 
expense ratio for the five-year average, ending 2012 recorded 31.43 per cent and the 
five-year average, ending 2012 efficiency ratio was 79.09 per cent.  
 
 53 
For ROA and ROE, it has recorded average of 9.94 per cent and 21.65 per cent 
respectively. 
 
Finally, the mean size, which was proxied by the natural log (ln) of market 
capitalization, was 9.14. This shows that at the end of 2012, the average market 
capitalization of the companies in the sample was RM9,347,030,000. The average total 
sales for 2012 of the sample companies stood at RM7,393,916,214, showing that the 
average total sales for the companies was 11.80 times greater than the average market 
capitalization. 
 
Table 4.2 : Descriptive Statistics : Top 50 Public Listed Companies 
 
  Debt 
ratio 
Size Growth Expense Efficiency ROA ROE 
  
Mean 0.2270 9.1428 0.1079 0.3143 0.7909 0.0994 0.2165 
Median 0.2229 8.8327 0.1019 0.1573 0.4414 0.0638 0.1345 
Standard 
deviation 
0.1568 0.8306 0.0904 0.3140 0.7265 0.0927 0.2837 
Variance 0.0250 0.6900 0.0080 0.0990 0.5280 0.0090 0.0810 
Skewness 0.4090 0.6990 0.7040 1.1120 1.6010 2.4150 4.0140 
Kurtosis 
-
0.3160 -0.6810 1.7680 -0.5060 2.0030 7.2130 18.5540 
Minimum 0.0000 8.0428 -0.1288 0.0274 0.0781 0.0121 0.0309 
Maximum 0.5898 10.9545 0.3738 0.9296 2.9263 0.5074 1.7595 
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4.3 Descriptive Analysis : Bottom 50 Public Listed Companies 
 
Table 4.3 gives the descriptive analysis for the main variables for the Bottom 50 
companies used in this study. The table shows the average debt ratio proportion is 21.13 
per cent. That means on average, the amount of debts of the sample companies is nearly 
to one-quarter of its total assets. While for growth, the average is -3.3 per cent with 
some companies having a 89.73 per cent and -54.90 per cent growth. The mean expense 
ratio for the five-year average, ending 2012 recorded 110 per cent and the five-year 
average, ending 2012 efficiency ratio was 77.91 per cent. For ROA and ROE, it has 
recorded average of -4.61 per cent and -11.12 per cent respectively. 
 
Finally, the mean size, which was proxied by the natural log (ln) of market 
capitalization, was 2.36. This shows that at the end of 2012, the average market 
capitalization of the companies in the sample was RM10,637,570. The average total 
sales for 2012 of the sample companies stood at RM52,911,328, showing that the 
average total sales for the companies was 4.97 times greater than the average market 
capitalization. 
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Table 4.3 : Descriptive Statistics : Bottom 50 Public Listed Companies 
  Debt 
ratio 
Size Growth Expense Efficiency ROA ROE 
  
Mean 0.2113 2.3644 -0.0331 1.1006 0.7791 -0.0461 -0.1112 
Median 0.1746 2.5350 -0.0289 0.4896 0.6439 -0.0283 -0.0463 
Standard 
deviation 
0.1885 0.4809 0.1711 2.8429 0.4977 0.0706 0.2320 
Variance 0.0360 0.2310 0.0290 8.0820 0.2480 0.0050 0.0540 
Skewness 1.2100 -1.9140 2.7260 6.2810 1.0050 -0.7370 -2.6760 
Kurtosis 1.4220 3.9070 19.0690 41.9930 0.6030 -0.0300 13.8540 
Minimum 0.0000 0.6677 -0.5490 0.0266 0.1034 -0.2223 -1.3034 
Maximum 0.7865 2.7804 0.8973 20.0073 2.1341 0.0761 0.4306 
        
 
 
4.4 Correlation Analysis – Pearson Correlation Matrix : 100 PLC 
 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix is shown in Table 4.4 which shows the relationship 
between the independent variable and dependent variable.  
 
The dependent variables, ROA and ROE are considered significantly correlated with all 
variables, either at the 0.01 or 0.05 level, except for the debt ratio. However, the 
correlation benchmark for this study is at the level of 0.05. Therefore, the dependent 
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variables, Return on Assets (ROA) is significantly correlated with only one independent 
variable at alpha = 0.05 level which is company growth. While Return on Equity (ROE) 
is significantly correlated with three of the independent variables at alpha = 0.05 level. 
ROE is negatively correlated with Expense (-0.208), and positively correlated with 
company growth (0.201) and profit margin (0.238). Based on the benchmark of alpha = 
0.05 level, the other independent variables were not significantly correlated with ROA 
& ROE. 
 
Among the independent variables, the top 2 highest correlation was between Size and 
Board rank, as well as Expense and Profit margin. The degree of collinearity for the two 
variables was 0.981 and -0.976 respectively; and both are significant at alpha = 0.05 
level. This means when Firm size moves or changes, Board rank will change 
accordingly by approximately 98.1 per cent; meanwhile when Expense moves or 
changes, Profit margin changes inversely by approximately 97.6 per cent.  
 
Table 4.4 : Pearson Correlation Matrix : 100 PLC 
 
Debt ratio 1 0.047 0.047 -0.135 -0.181 -0.085 -0.106
Size 0.047 1 0.442 ** -0.218 * 0.017 0.675 ** 0.576 **
Growth 0.047 0.442 ** 1 -0.402 ** -0.082 0.214 * 0.201 *
Expense -0.135 -0.218 * -0.402 ** 1 -0.113 -0.296 ** -0.208 *
Efficiency -0.181 0.017 -0.082 -0.113 1 0.44 ** 0.439 **
ROA -0.085 0.675 ** 0.214 * -0.296 ** 0.44 ** 1 0.870 **
ROE -0.106 0.576 ** 0.201 * -0.208 * 0.439 ** 0.87 ** 1
ROA ROE
Debt 
ratio
Size Growth Expense Efficiency
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
4.5 Correlation Analysis – Pearson Correlation Matrix : Top 50 PLC 
 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix is shown in Table 4.5 which shows the relationship 
between the independent variable and dependent variable.  
 
The dependent variables, ROA and ROE are considered significantly correlated with all 
variables, either at the 0.01 or 0.05 level, except for the debt ratio, firm size and 
expense. However, the correlation benchmark for this study is at the level of 0.05. 
Therefore, the dependent variables, Return on Assets (ROA) is significantly correlated 
with two of independent variable at alpha = 0.05 level which is company growth 
(0.373), and efficiency (0.708).  
 
While Return on Equity (ROE) is significantly correlated with only one the independent 
variables at alpha = 0.05 level, which is efficiency (0.669). Based on the benchmark of 
alpha = 0.05 level, the other independent variables were not significantly correlated with 
ROA & ROE. The highest growth among the Independent and Dependent variables was 
between ROA and Efficiency. The degree of collinearity of both variables was 0.708, 
significant at alpha = 0.05. This means when efficiency moves or changes, ROA 
changes approximately by 70.8%. 
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Among the independent variables, the highest correlation was between Growth and 
Efficiency. The degree of collinearity for the two variables was -0.316, significant at 
alpha = 0.05 level. This means when growth moves or changes, efficiency will change 
inversely by approximately 31.6 per cent. 
 
Table 4.5 : Pearson Correlation Matrix : Top 50 PLC 
 
  Debt 
ratio 
  
Size 
  
Growth 
  
Expense 
  
Efficiency 
  
ROA 
  
ROE 
  
                
Debt ratio 1   0.116   0.154   0.158   -0.158   
-
0.200   0.045   
Size 0.116   1   -0.250   0.210   0.007   0.025   0.130   
Growth 0.154   
-
0.250   1   -0.110   -0.316 * 
-
0.373 ** 
-
0.313 * 
Expense 0.158   0.210   -0.110   1   -0.158   
-
0.182   
-
0.069   
Efficiency 
-
0.158   0.007   -0.316 * -0.158   1   0.708 ** 0.669 ** 
ROA 
-
0.200   0.025   -0.373 ** -0.182   0.708 ** 1   0.899 ** 
ROE 
 
0.045 
   
0.130 
   
-0.313 
 
* 
 
-0.069 
   
0.669 
 
** 
 
0.899 
 
** 
 
1 
   
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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4.6 Correlation Analysis – Pearson Correlation Matrix : Bottom  50 PLC 
 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix is shown in Table 4.6  which shows the relationship 
between the independent variable and dependent variable.  
 
The dependent variables, ROA and ROE are considered significantly correlated with all 
variables, either at the 0.01 or 0.05 level, except for the growth. However, the 
correlation benchmark for this study is at the level of 0.05. Therefore, the dependent 
variables, Return on Assets (ROA) is significantly correlated with only one independent 
variable at alpha = 0.05 level which is firm size. While Return on Equity (ROE) is 
significantly correlated with two of the independent variables at alpha = 0.05 level. ROE 
is negatively correlated with Debt ratio (-0.365), and positively correlated with firm size 
(0.646). Based on the benchmark of alpha = 0.05 level, the other independent variables 
were not significantly correlated with ROA & ROE. 
 
Among the independent variables, the highest correlation was between Growth and 
Expense. The degree of collinearity for the two variables was -0.402 , significant at 
alpha = 0.05 level. This means when Growth moves or changes, Expense will change 
inversely by approximately 40.2 per cent. 
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Table 4.6  : Pearson Correlation Matrix : Bottom 50 PLC 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant  at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
4.7 Univariate Analysis of Variance : 100 PLC 
 
Univariate analysis involves describing the distribution of a single variable, including its 
central tendency (including the mean, median, and mode) and dispersion (including the 
range and quantiles of the data-set, and measures of spread such as the variance and 
standard deviation). The shape of the distribution may also be described via indices such 
as skewness and kurtosis. Characteristics of a variable's distribution may also be 
depicted in graphical or tabular format, including histograms and stem-and-leaf display. 
Debt ratio 1 -0.140 -0.025 -0.182 -0.225 -0.112 -0.365 **
Size -0.140 1 0.087 -0.348 * 0.129 0.456 ** 0.646 **
Growth -0.025 0.087 1 -0.402 ** 0.049 -0.003 0.087
Expense -0.182 -0.348 * -0.402 ** 1 -0.176 -0.354 * -0.192
Efficiency -0.225 0.129 0.049 -0.176 1 0.340 * 0.245
ROA -0.112 0.456 ** -0.003 -0.354 * 0.340 * 1 0.676 **
ROE -0.365 ** 0.646 ** 0.087 -0.192 0.245 0.676 ** 1
ROA ROE
Debt 
ratio
Size Growth Expense Efficiency
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Table 4.7 summarizes the relationship between Return on Assets and company specific 
characteristic. In this study the performance of the company is measured by Return on 
Assets (ROA).  
 
Table 4.7 (i) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROA and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
ROA 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Significant 
 
Debt ratio -0.054 -0.840 0.403 
Size 0.021 9.065 0.000 
Growth 0.153 2.173 0.032 
Expense -0.016 -3.067 0.003 
Efficiency 
 
0.078 
 
4.854 
 
0.000 
 
 
Table 4.7 (i) provides the results of univariate analysis of ROA against the independent 
variables. From the analysis, it shows that the result of the relationship between firm 
size, growth, expense, efficiency, profit margin and board rank with Return on asset 
(ROA) are significant, which given  t-significant value stand is < 0.05. Hence, it can be 
inferred that hypothesis is supported which is explained that there is significant 
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relationship among firm size, growth, expense, efficiency, profit margin and board rank 
with Return on assets (ROA).  
 
While Debt ratio show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, which is not significant. 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio with Return on assets 
(ROA). 
 
Table 4.3b summarizes the relationship between Return on Equity and company specific 
characteristic. In this study the performance of the company is measured by Return on 
Equity (ROE).  
 
Table 4.7 (ii) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROE and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
ROE 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Significant 
 
Debt ratio -0.188 -1.059 0.292 
Size 0.051 6.971 0.000 
Growth 0.400 2.027 0.045 
Expense -0.031 -2.108 0.038 
Efficiency 
 
0.217 
 
4.837 
 
0.000 
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Table 4.7 (ii) provides the results of univariate analysis of ROE against the independent 
variables. From the analysis between firm size, growth, expense, efficiency, profit 
margin and board rank with Return on equity (ROE) shows that t-significant value stand 
is < 0.05, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis is supported 
which is explained that there is significant relationship among firm size, growth, 
expense, efficiency, profit margin and board rank with Return on equity (ROE). 
 
While Debt ratio show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, which is not significant. 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio with Return on equity 
(ROE). 
 
4.8 Univariate Analysis of Variance : Top 50 PLC 
 
Table 4.8 (i) summarizes the relationship between Return on Assets and company 
specific characteristic for the Top 50 Companies. In this study the performance of the 
company is measured by Return on Assets (ROA).  
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Table 4.8 (i) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROA and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
ROA 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Significant 
 
Debt ratio -0.338 -1.413 0.164 
Size 0.222 0.172 0.864 
Growth -0.363 -2.783 0.008 
Expense -0.617 -1.283 0.206 
Efficiency 
 
5.553 
 
6.955 
 
0.000 
 
 
Table 4.8 (i)  provides the results of univariate analysis of ROA against the independent 
variables for yje Top 50 companies. From the analysis, it shows that the result of the 
relationship between growth, and efficiency  with Return on asset (ROA) are significant, 
which given  t-significant value stand is < 0.05. Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis 
is not rejected which is explained that there is significant relationship among firm 
growth, and efficiency with Return on assets (ROA).  
 
While Debt ratio, firm size, and expense show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, 
which is not significant. Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio, 
firm size and expense with Return on assets (ROA). 
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Table 4.8 (ii) summarizes the relationship between Return on Equity and company 
specific characteristic for the Top 50 companies. In this study the performance of the 
company is measured by Return on Equity (ROE).  
 
Table 4.8 (ii) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROE and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
ROE 
Coefficient t-statistic Significant 
Debt ratio 0.025 0.311 0.757 
Size 0.381 0.909 0.368 
Growth -0.100 -2.279 0.027 
Expense -0.076 -0.480 0.634 
Efficiency 
 
1.713 
 
6.237 
 
0.000 
 
 
Table 4.8 (ii)  provides the results of univariate analysis of ROE against the independent 
variables for the Top 50  companies. From the analysis growth, and efficiency  with 
Return on equity (ROE) shows that t-significant value stand is < 0.05, which is 
significant. Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis is not rejected which is explained 
that there is significant relationship among firm growth, and efficiency with Return on 
assets (ROE).  
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While Debt ratio, firm size, and expense show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, 
which is not significant. Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio, 
firm size and expense with Return on assets (ROE). 
 
4.9 Univariate Analysis of Variance : Bottom 50 PLC 
 
Table 4.9 (i) summarizes the relationship between Return on Assets and company 
specific characteristic for the Bottom 50 companies. In this study the performance of the 
company is measured by Return on Assets (ROA).  
 
Table 4.9 (i) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROA and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
ROA 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Significant 
 
Debt ratio -0.054 -0.840 0.403 
Size 0.021 9.065 0.000 
Growth 0.153 2.173 0.032 
Expense -0.016 -3.067 0.003 
Efficiency 0.078 4.854 0.000 
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Table 4.9 (i) provides the results of univariate analysis of ROA against the independent 
variables for the Bottom 50 companies. From the analysis, it shows that the result of the 
relationship between firm size, growth, expense, and efficiency with Return on asset 
(ROA) are significant, which given  t-significant value stand is < 0.05. Hence, it can be 
inferred that hypothesis is not rejected which is explained that there is significant 
relationship among firm size, growth, expense,  and efficiency with Return on assets 
(ROA).  
 
While Debt ratio show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, which is not significant. 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio with Return on assets 
(ROA). 
 
Table 4.9 (ii) summarizes the relationship between Return on Equity and company 
specific characteristic. In this study the performance of the company is measured by 
Return on Equity (ROE).  
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Table 4.9 (ii) : Univariate analysis for relationship between ROE and company 
specific characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
ROE 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Significant 
 
Debt ratio -0.188 -1.059 0.292 
Size 0.051 6.971 0.000 
Growth 0.400 2.027 0.045 
Expense -0.031 -2.108 0.038 
Efficiency 0.217 4.837 0.000 
    
 
Table 4.9 (ii) provides the results of univariate analysis of ROE against the independent 
variables for the Bottom 50 companies. From the analysis between firm size, growth, 
expense, and efficiency with Return on equity (ROE) shows that t-significant value 
stand is < 0.05, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis is 
supported which is explained that there is significant relationship among between firm 
size, growth, expense, and efficiency with Return on equity (ROE). 
 
While Debt ratio show that t-significant value stand is > 0.05, which is not significant. 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship among Debt ratio with Return on equity 
(ROE). 
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4.10 Linear Regression Analysis :  
Hypotheses Testing : Pearson Correlation Coefficient – 100 PLC 
 
In statistics, linear regression is an approach for modeling the relationship between a 
scalar dependent variable y and one or more explanatory variables denoted X. The case 
of one explanatory variable is called simple linear regression. For more than one 
explanatory variable, the process is called multiple linear regression 
 
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is a statistical formula that measures the strength 
between variables and relationships. When conducting a statistical test between two 
variables, a Pearson Correlation Coefficient value analysis also has been conducted in 
order to determine just how strong that relationship is between those two variables. 
 
Table 4.10 summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis of ROA & ROE 
against the independent variables for 100 companies (Top 50 and Bottom 50) using the 
enter procedure method, where the regression equation was built up one variable at a 
time.  
 
The results show that the independent variables in the model could explain 64.6  per 
cent of the variation in ROA with an F-value of 37.093 and a probability of 0.000. This 
means that collectively, the determining variables have a significant impact on ROA. 
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When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Firm Size, Expense and Efficiency are found to be 
statistically significant at alpha <0.05 level to explain the variation in ROA, while the 
other independent variables were not statistically significant in explaining the variation 
in ROA. 
 
Meanwhile, the results also show that the independent variables in the model could 
explain 49.7 per cent of the variation in ROE with an F-value of 20.544 and a 
probability of 0.000. This means that collectively, the determining variables have a 
significant impact on ROE. 
 
When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Firm Size and Efficiency were found to be statistically 
significant at alpha <0.05 level to explain the variation in ROE, while the other 
independent variables were not statistically significant in explaining the variation in 
ROE. 
 
From  Table 4.10, there are two measurement of performance which is Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). It show that for ROA, the R square resulted from 
the analysis represent by 0.664 which means that only 66.4 percent of variability of data 
regressed, explained the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Meanwhile for ROE show that R square resulted from the analysis represent by 0.522 
which means that 52.2 percent of the variation in the return on Equity (ROE) by the 
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variation in the independent variables. Nevertheless, the R square value does not have a 
critical value that enables a conclusion to be drawn. (Keller and Warrack, 2003) 
 
Table 4.10 : Regression for relationship between corporate performance and 
company specific characteristics 
 
 
  
4.10.1  Correlation testing between Debt Ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
Table 4.10 depicts that the debt ratio for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) show t- significant value stand at 0.318 and 0.369 respectively, which mean not 
significant. This reveals that there is no sufficient evidence to infer that there is a linear 
relationship between level of debt  in the company and company performance. As such, 
hypothesis null is supported which explained there is no significant relationship between 
debt ratio and return on assets (ROA), as well as debt ratio and return on equity (ROE). 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance
Debt ratio -0.039 0.039 -1.004 0.318 0.941 -0.117 0.130 -0.902 0.369 0.941
Size 0.022 0.002 10.308 0.000 0.799 0.051 0.007 7.239 0.000 0.799
Growth -0.085 0.052 -1.651 0.102 0.689 -0.087 0.171 -0.507 0.613 0.689
Expense -0.008 0.004 -2.349 0.021 0.796 -0.009 0.012 -0.786 0.434 0.796
Efficiency 0.069 0.011 6.264 0.000 0.925 0.201 0.037 5.481 0.000 0.925
R-squared 0.664 0.522
Adjusted R-squared 0.646 0.497
F-statistic 37.093 20.544
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.970 1.558
ROA ROE
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the coefficient is negative. This result in 
contrast with the study by Jensen (1999) and Doukas et. al which have proven that debt 
ratio is significantly related to agency costs in a company. 
 
4.10.2   Correlation testing between Firm’s Size and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between size and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.429, which is not significant. Table 4.10 shows that the 
coefficient for firm size (t = 0.795) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
positive at 0.008. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for each 
additional increase in the firm size, no significant changes in return on assets (ROA), 
Hence, it can be inferred that hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between size and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.006, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis is supported, which explained that there is significant relationship between 
size and return on equity (ROE). Table 4.10 shows that the coefficient for firm size (t = 
2.824) and the coefficient is positive at 0.093. This means that holding other explanatory 
variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm size, the return on equity 
(ROE) increases on average by 0.093,. In other words, as the firm size increases will 
lead to the increases in the return on equity (ROE).  
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4.10.3   Correlation testing between Company growth and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between growth and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.102, which is not significant. Table 4.10 shows that the 
coefficient for company growth (t = -1.651) which is not significant, and the coefficient 
is negative at 0.085. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on 
assets (ROA). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between growth and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.613, which is not significant. Table 4.10 shows that the 
coefficient for company growth (t = 0.171) which is not significant, and the coefficient 
is negative at 0.087. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for 
each additional increase in the growth, no significant changes in return on equity (ROE), 
Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
This result is in contrast to the study by Crutchley and Jensen (1999), company growth 
which was measured by sales growth, was found to be positively and significantly 
related with agency costs. 
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4.10.4   Correlation testing between Expense ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between expense and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.021, which is significant. Table 4.10 shows that the 
coefficient for expense (t = 2.349) and the coefficient is negative at 0.008. Hence, the 
expense is significantly related with Return on Asset (ROA) which explained that 
hypothesis is supported. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, 
each additional increase in expense will lead to increases in ROA on average by 2.349. 
In other words, as the expense increase, the ROA also increases. 
From the analysis between expense and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.434, which is not significant. Table 4.10 shows that the 
coefficient for expense (t = -0.786) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
negative at 0.009. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for each 
additional increase in the expense, no significant changes in return on equity (ROE), 
Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.10.5   Correlation testing between Efficiency ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis, the efficiency for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
in the table shows that t-significant value stand at 0.000, which is significant. Table 4.10 
shows that for ROA, the coefficient for efficiency (t = 6.264), and the coefficient is 
positive at 0.069. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for each 
additional increase in the efficiency will lead to the increases in  return on assets (ROA) 
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on average by 0.069, Meanwhile, for return on equity (ROE), the coefficient for 
efficiency (t = 5.481) and the coefficient is positive at 0.201. . This means that holding 
other explanatory variables constant, for each additional increase in the efficiency will 
lead to the increases in  return on equity (ROE) on average by 0.201. Hence,  the 
hypothesis is not rejected. In other words, as the efficiency increases, the return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) also increases.  
 
The results on both Expense and Efficiency variables in this study are in line with the 
study by Ang et. Al. (2000), where expense and efficiency ratio ware found significantly 
related to agency costs, despite positive nor negative coefficient. 
 
 
4.11  Linear Regression Analysis 
Hypotheses Testing : Pearson Correlation Coefficient – Top 50 PLC 
 
Table 4.11 summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis of ROA & ROE 
against the independent variables for the Top 50 companies using the enter procedure 
method, where the regression equation was built up one variable at a time.  
 
The results show that the independent variables in the model could explain 87  per cent 
of the variation in ROA with an F-value of 55.676 and a probability of 0.000. This 
means that collectively, the determining variables have a significant impact on ROA. 
 76 
When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Debt ratio are found to be statistically significant at alpha 
<0.05 level to explain the variation in ROA, while the other independent variables were 
not statistically significant in explaining the variation in ROA. 
 
Meanwhile, the results also show that the independent variables in the model could 
explain 43.5 per cent of the variation in ROE with an F-value of 8.544 and a probability 
of 0.000. This means that collectively, the determining variables have a significant 
impact on ROE. 
 
When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Efficiency were found to be statistically significant at 
alpha <0.05 level to explain the variation in ROE, while the other independent variables 
were not statistically significant in explaining the variation in ROE. 
 
From  Table 4.11, there are two measurement of performance which is Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). It show that for ROA, the R square resulted from 
the analysis represent by 0.886 which means that only 88.6 percent of variability of data 
regressed, explained the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Meanwhile for ROE show that R square resulted from the analysis represent by 0.493 
which means that 49.3  percent of the variation in the return on Equity (ROE) by the 
variation in the independent variables.  
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Table 4.11 : Regression for relationship between corporate performance and 
company specific characteristics 
 
 
4.11.1   Correlation testing between Debt Ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
Table 4.11 depicts that the debt ratio for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) show t- significant value stand at 0.001 and 0.161  respectively, which means it 
is statistically significant at alpha <0.05 to explain the variation in ROA. Conversely, it 
is not statistically significant with ROE which reveals that there is no sufficient 
evidence to infer that there is a linear relationship between level of debt  in the company 
and company performance represented by ROE.  As such, hypothesis null is supported 
for ROE which explained there is no significant relationship between debt ratio and 
return on equity (ROE) while the hypothesis null is rejected for ROA which conclude 
that the level of debt of company is significantly related to ROA. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to observe that the coefficient is negative. 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance
Debt ratio -0.113 0.032 -3.477 0.001 0.882 0.288 0.202 1.425 0.161 0.923
Size -0.007 0.006 -1.194 0.239 0.876 0.029 0.039 0.734 0.467 0.887
Growth -0.084 0.060 -1.416 0.164 0.788 -0.349 0.376 -0.927 0.359 0.803
Expense -0.022 0.016 -1.403 0.168 0.899 -0.018 0.102 -0.180 0.858 0.900
Efficiency 0.011 0.009 1.201 0.236 0.496 0.256 0.045 5.644 0.000 0.855
R-squared 0.886 0.493
Adjusted R-squared 0.870 0.435
F-statistic 55.676 8.544
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 2.648 1.874
ROA ROE
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4.11.2   Correlation testing between Firm’s Size and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between size and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.239, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for firm size (t = 1.194) and the coefficient is negative at 0.007. This means 
that holding other explanatory variables constant , for each additional increase in the 
firm size, no significant changes in return on assets (ROA),. Hence, it can be inferred 
that hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between size and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.467, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for firm size (t = 0.734) and the coefficient is negative at 0.029. This means 
that holding other explanatory variables constant , for each additional increase in the 
firm size, no significant changes in return on assets (ROE),. Hence, it can be inferred 
that hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.11.3   Correlation testing between Company growth and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between growth and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.164, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for company growth (t = -1.416) which is not significant, and the coefficient 
is negative at 0.084. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on 
assets (ROA). Hence,  the hypothesis is rejected. 
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From the analysis between growth and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.359, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for company growth (t = -0.927) which is not significant, and the coefficient 
is negative at 0.349. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for 
each additional increase in the growth, no significant changes in return on equity (ROE), 
Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.11.4   Correlation testing between Expense ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between expense and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.168, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for expense (t = -1.212) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
negative at 0.022. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on assets 
(ROA). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between expense and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.858, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for expense (t = 0.102) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
negative at 0.018. This means that for each additional increase in the expense, no 
significant changes in return on equity (ROE), holding other explanatory variables 
constant. Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
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4.11.5   Correlation testing between Efficiency ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between efficiency and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that 
t-significant value stand at 0.236, which is not significant. Table 4.11 shows that the 
coefficient for company growth (t = 1.201) which is not significant, and the coefficient 
is positive at 0.011. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on assets 
(ROA). Hence,  the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between efficiency and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that 
t-significant value stand at 0.000, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis is supported, which explained that there is significant relationship between 
efficiency and return on equity (ROE). Table 4.11 shows that the coefficient for firm 
size (t = 5.644) and the coefficient is positive at 0.256. This means that holding other 
explanatory variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm size, the return 
on equity (ROE) increases on average by 0.256,. In other words, as the firm size 
increases will lead to the increases in the return on equity (ROE).  
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4.12 Linear Regression Analysis 
Hypotheses Testing : Pearson Correlation Coefficient – Bottom 50 PLC 
 
Table 4.12 summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis of ROA & ROE 
against the independent variables for the Bottom 50 Companies using the enter 
procedure method, where the regression equation was built up one variable at a time.  
 
The results show that the independent variables in the model could explain 26.3 per cent 
of the variation in ROA with an F-value of 4.495 and a probability of 0.002. This means 
that collectively, the determining variables have a significant impact on ROA. 
 
When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Firm size are found to be statistically significant at alpha 
<0.05 level to explain the variation in ROA, while the other independent variables were 
not statistically significant in explaining the variation in ROA. 
 
Meanwhile, the results also show that the independent variables in the model could 
explain 45 per cent of the variation in ROE with an F-value of 9.013 and a probability of 
0.000. This means that collectively, the determining variables have a significant impact 
on ROE. 
 
When each determining variable was examined individually while holding the 
remaining predictors constant, Debt ratio & Firm Size were found to be statistically 
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significant at alpha <0.05 level to explain the variation in ROE, while the other 
independent variables were not statistically significant in explaining the variation in 
ROE. 
 
From  Table 4.12 , there are two measurement of performance which is Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). It show that for ROA, the R square resulted 
from the analysis represent by 0.338  which means that only 33.8 percent of variability 
of data regressed, explained the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. Meanwhile for ROE show that R square resulted from the analysis represent 
by 0.506 which means that 50.6 percent of the variation in the return on Equity (ROE) 
by the variation in the independent variables. 
 
Table 4.12 : Regression for relationship between corporate performance and 
company specific characteristics 
 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Sig Tolerance
Debt ratio -0.024 0.050 -0.473 0.639 0.843 -0.317 0.142 -2.233 0.031 0.843
Size 0.049 0.020 2.496 0.016 0.829 0.286 0.056 5.090 0.000 0.829
Growth -0.063 0.056 -1.135 0.263 0.819 0.030 0.159 0.186 0.853 0.819
Expense -0.007 0.004 -1.762 0.085 0.653 0.000 0.011 -0.037 0.971 0.653
Efficiency 0.034 0.018 1.878 0.067 0.898 0.051 0.052 0.969 0.338 0.898
R-squared 0.338 0.506
Adjusted R-squared 0.263 0.450
F-statistic 4.495 9.013
Prob (F-statistic) 0.002 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 2.101 1.664
ROA ROE
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4.12.1   Correlation testing between Debt Ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
Table 4.12 depicts that the debt ratio for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) show t- significant value stand at 0.639 and 0.031  respectively, which mean not 
significant. This reveals that there is no sufficient evidence to infer that there is a linear 
relationship between level of debt  in the company and company performance 
represented by ROA. As such, hypothesis null is supported which explained there is no 
significant relationship between debt ratio and return on assets (ROA), as well as debt 
ratio and return on equity (ROE). Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the 
coefficient is negative. 
 
4.12.2   Correlation testing between Firm’s Size and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between size and Return on Asset  (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.016, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis is supported, which explained that there is significant relationship between 
size and Return on Asset  (ROA). Table 4.12 shows that the coefficient for firm size (t = 
2.496) and the coefficient is positive at 0.049. This means that holding other explanatory 
variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm size, Return on Asset  (ROA) 
increases on average by 0.049, In other words, as the firm size increases will lead to the 
increases in the Return on Asset  (ROA). 
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From the analysis between size and Return on Equity  (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.000, which is significant. Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis is supported, which explained that there is significant relationship between 
size and Return on Equity  (ROE) Table 4.12 shows that the coefficient for firm size (t = 
5.090) and the coefficient is positive at 0.286. This means that holding other explanatory 
variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm size, Return on Equity  
(ROE)  increases on average by 0.286, In other words, as the firm size increases will 
lead to the increases in the Return on Equity  (ROE). Hence, it can be inferred that 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
4.12.3  Correlation testing between Company growth and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between Growth and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.263, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Growth (t = -1.135) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
negative at 0.063. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on assets 
(ROA). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between Growth and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that t-
significant value stand at 0.853, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Growth (t = 0.186) which is not significant, and the coefficient is positive 
at 0.030. This means that for each additional increase in the Growth, no significant 
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changes in return on equity (ROE), holding other explanatory variables constant. Hence, 
the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.12.4   Correlation testing between Expense ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between Expense and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that 
t-significant value stand at 0.085, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Expense (t = -1.762) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
positive at 0.007. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on assets 
(ROA). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between Expense and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows that 
t-significant value stand at 0.971, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Expense (t = -0.037) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
positive at 0.000. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for each 
additional increase in the Expense, no significant changes in return on equity (ROE). 
Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.12.5   Correlation testing between Efficiency ratio and ROA/ROE 
 
From the analysis between Efficiency and return on assets (ROA) in the table shows that 
t-significant value stand at 0.085, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Efficiency (t = -1.762) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
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positive at 0.007. It means that there is no significant difference in the return on assets 
(ROA). Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
From the analysis between Efficiency and return on equity (ROE) in the table shows 
that t-significant value stand at 0.971, which is not significant. Table 4.12 shows that the 
coefficient for Efficiency (t = -0.037) which is not significant, and the coefficient is 
positive at 0.000. This means that holding other explanatory variables constant, for each 
additional increase in the Efficiency, no significant changes in return on equity (ROE). 
Hence, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
4.13 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, researcher use SPSS to process and tabulate the data. Based on this data, 
analysis of descriptive statistic, univariate analysis, pearson and correlation coefficient 
test have been used. These test can give us the result on hypotheses developed earlier.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the conclusion of the study that has been carried out and the 
implications of the results for the benefit of future study. This study is intended to 
determine the relationship between the five independent variables namely debt ratio, 
firm’s size, company growth, expense ratio, efficiency ratio; and a dependent variable, 
corporate performance. This chapter also presented the implications and further 
recommendations for future research. 
 
5.1 Findings & Discussions 
 
By using 100 companies listed as Top 50 and Bottom 50 of the Bursa Malaysia in the 
year 2008 to 2012, seven determining variables were regressed against the ROA and 
ROE.  
 
The Firm size, Growth, Expense, and Efficiency was found to have significant effect in 
explaining the performance of the company which is ROA and ROE. Based on ROA, 
the variable could explain  64.6 per cent of the variation in ROA with an F-value of 
37.093 and a probability of 0.000. This means that collectively, the determining 
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variables have a significant impact on ROA. The other independent variables were 
found to have no significant effect in explaining the variation of ROA for the 
regressions. 
 
Based on the result, it can be inferred that, when each determining variable was 
examined individually while holding the remaining predictors constant, Firm size, 
Growth, Expense, and Efficiency are found to be statistically significant at alpha <0.05 
level to explain the variation in ROA, while the other independent variables were not 
statistically significant in explaining the variation in ROA. 
 
Meanwhile, the Firm size, Growth, Expense, and Efficiency also were found to have a 
significant effect in explaining the variation of ROE. These variables could explain 49.7 
per cent of the variation in ROE with an F-value of 20.544 and a probability of 0.000. 
This means that collectively, the determining variables have a significant impact on 
ROE. The other independent variables were found to have no significant effect in 
explaining the variation of ROE for the regressions. 
 
Based on the result, it can be inferred that, when each determining variable was 
examined individually while holding the remaining predictors constant, Firm size, 
Growth, Expense, and Efficiency were found to be statistically significant at alpha 
<0.05 level to explain the variation in ROE, while the other independent variables were 
not statistically significant in explaining the variation in ROE. 
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From the Multiple linear regression analysis, the result shows that the coefficient for 
firm size (t = 10.308), Expense (t = -2.349) and Efficiency (t= 6.464), are significant. 
While the coefficient are 0.022, -0.008, and 0.069 respectively. This means that . 
holding other explanatory variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm 
size, expense, and Efficiency, the Return on Asset (ROA) increases on average by 
0.022, decreases by -0.008, and increases by 0.069 respectively. In other words, as the 
firm size, Expense and Efficiency increases, the return on equity (ROA) also increases.  
 
Meanwhile in regards to Return on Equity (ROE), the result also shows that the 
coefficient for firm size (t = 7.239), and Efficiency (t= 5.481), are significant. While the 
coefficient are positive at 0.051 and 0.201 respectively. This means that . holding other 
explanatory variables constant, for each additional increase in the firm size and 
Efficiency, the Return on Equity (ROE)) increases on average by 0.051 and 0.201 
respectively. In other words, as the firm size  and Efficiency increases, Return on Equity 
(ROE) also increases.  
 
Besides, this research use the Pearson Correlation Matrix. From the result, the 
dependent variables, ROA and ROE are considered significantly correlated with all 
variables, either at the 0.01 or 0.05 level, except for the debt ratio. However, the 
correlation benchmark for this study is at the level of 0.05. Therefore, the dependent 
variables, Return on Assets (ROA) is significantly correlated with only one independent 
variable at alpha = 0.05 level which is company growth. While Return on Equity (ROE) 
is significantly correlated with three of the independent variables at alpha = 0.05 level. 
ROE is negatively correlated with Expense (-0.208), and positively correlated with 
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company growth (0.201) and profit margin (0.238). Based on the benchmark of alpha = 
0.05 level, the other independent variables were not significantly correlated with ROA 
& ROE. 
 
5.2 Summary of major findings 
 
Among the independent variables, the top 2 highest correlation was between Size and 
Board rank, as well as Expense and Profit margin. The degree of collinearity for the two 
variables was 0.981 and -0.976 respectively; and both are significant at alpha = 0.05 
level. This means when Firm size moves or changes, Board rank will change 
accordingly by approximately 98.1 per cent; meanwhile when Expense moves or 
changes, Profit margin changes inversely by approximately 97.6 per cent.  
 
5.3 Implication of the Study 
 
This study found the relationship between agency cost and corporate performance, 
where performance of the company is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return 
on Equity (ROE). The agency theory in modern corporate finance suggests the presence 
of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders in firms. Hence,  this 
research has identified the important mechanism that is likely to mitigate these agency 
costs. 
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5.4 Theoritical & Practical of the Study 
 
Several implications can be formulated based on the findings that have been obtained. 
The implications are as follows:  
 
Theory contribution 
1. It is n additional empirical prove in explaining the relationship of the agency 
cost towards the corporate performance. 
2. It provides some information for the future research and it can be such an 
indicator and reference for future research especially in Malaysian context. 
3. Explaining the contribution factors towards corporate performance through the 
proxy of agenct costs. 
 
Practical contribution 
1. It gives more understanding to the shareholder on how to handle and align with 
their management as well as to reduce agency cost and increase corporate 
performance. 
2. It gives an  opportunities to the organizations in Malaysia industry in improving 
their systems and policy in managing agency relationship issues. 
3. Determination of the contribution factor through data analysis 
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5.5  Recommendation for future study 
 
The research could be well developed and better interpreted  in a different ways in 
consideration of the followings: 
 
 (1) A repeat of the study, which takes all listed companies in Bursa Malaysia and PN 17 
companies in Malaysia as sample and examines the relationship between agency cost 
and corporate performance. There was no more “main board” and “second board” of 
companies in KLSE. Companies that triggered any of the criteria pursuant to Practice 
Note 17 of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad 
which came into effect on 3 August 2009. In view of this, there should be a 
comprehensive study on characteristics of all listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. The 
results might be different as compared to the current study as this study only focusing 
on the Top 50 and the Bottom 50 listed companies which is assuming the similar 
categorization as before, i.e Main Board & Second Board; therefore limited in its 
coverage. 
 
 (2) The direct measurements of company performance in this study are Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). For future research, take the Tobin Q as 
measured based on performance of the company. During the research as well as the 
analysis processes several other ideas turned up that could be of interest and worthwhile 
to investigate more thoroughly.  
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(3) For future research, it could be the same method of data collection such as relies on 
secondary data that obtained from published report in time series. In this study, it took 
time series data from the year of 2008 to 2012 as available are used for estimation. A 
repeat of research, proposed to take time series data from the year of 2013 onwards. 
These annually data were obtained from Bursa Malaysia, and other else. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The study can give us indicator on the affecting factors and can be used to predict the 
corporate performance among public listed companies in Malaysia.  
The result gathered after analyzing the data acquired from Bursa Malaysia before 
explained that only Firm’s size, Expense and Efficiency has the relationship with the 
significant value of 0.000. Debt ratio and growth variables was not significant with 
Corporate Performance. 
In summary, by this result, it may help the organisation to re-form and re-design its 
management and monitoring system as to be able to maximize shareholder wealth and 
reduce the agency costs. 
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